Leaky Processors: When the Laws of Nature Reveal Secrets

Michael Schwarz
Forschung in Natur- und Ingenieurwissenschaften Saarland University, July 15, 2024

This talk explores how subtle physical effects and microarchitectural behaviors within modern computing systems can allow attackers to extract or manipulate sensitive information. By examining a variety of side-channel methods-ranging from simple timing measurements in software-based PIN checks to more complex microarchitectural vulnerabilities like Meltdown and power-based attacks-we see how small clues can yield large security breaches. We show how attackers can measure execution times, cache states, and even power consumption to infer secrets, and highlight how frequency scaling can inadvertently leak cryptographic keys. Furthermore, we discuss how Rowhammer attacks can physically alter memory contents, enabling privilege escalation and other severe compromises. Through these examples, attendees gain an appreciation for the complexity of ensuring security in an environment where seemingly invisible hardware details can have significant consequences.